The part of the interview which I found most interesting was
Haldane’s identification of corporate governance failings as a critical reason
for what he calls “catastrophic errors” in decision making. Haldane says that these problems are
particularly acute in banking and financial institutions:
this has led to a
corporate governance structure in which those owning maybe 5% of the balance
sheet – i.e. the shareholders – have the primary, some would say the exclusive,
power in controlling the fortunes of the firm.
There is no say from the debt-holders or depositors or workers or any
sense of the wider public good which we know to be important in banking and
finance. We also know that those firms
are working on time horizons which in some cases are really quite short. So to think that his will necessarily lead to
the best outcome, even for the longer-term value of the firm, is questionable
given the governance model.
He asks how
corporate governance structures evolved into those which we see today:
at each
stage it was a sensible reason. But it
led to a corporate governance structure that looks pretty peculiar, given where
we started off 150 years ago. So what I
mentioned about structures and incentives – an important thing about that is
who runs the firm and how they run the firm.
I think that corporate governance in the way I’ve defined it is super
important – more important than regulation in getting us into a better place.
So we have it from a director of our central bank: the reform
of corporate governance is critical to the financial stability of our economic
system, more important than regulation.
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